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1. Introduction 
The term ‘fisheries management’ at first glance seems to be a reasonably unproblematic 
one.  It implies that firstly, that there are resources called fish, and secondly, that these 
resources called fish can be harvested and managed.  So far, so good.  Next, there is the 
word ‘convention’.  It is a commonly understood word in law in general and there are 
many conventions in International law and in International environmental law as well.  
Lastly there is the term ‘sustainable development’, a well-used term in International 
theory and practice, usually said to mean that although we understand the finite nature of 
the matter and energy that can be safely used by countries to develop, this can be 
tempered by putting in place measures and instruments to curb the excesses of human, 
and by that I mean industrialised, human activity on the environment. 
 
The majority of the literature on international environmental law does not consider any of 
the above to be anything other than part of the lexicon of terms that are used to describe 
and to analyse environmental problems. Similarly ‘ocean space’ is now increasingly 
divided up by regional bodies, established by conventions to oversee the management of 
(usually) labelled species that are to be managed and or protected by these bodies that 
have a series of measures that have been designed to ensure the survivability of the 
resources under our gaze.  Ernst Haas asked the provocative question in the 1970s ‘Why 
“ocean space” rather than “the human environment”, “the ecosystem”, “atmospheric 
space” or ”outer space”?’
1
   
 
What Haas did was to ground the concept ‘ocean space’ as materiality giving that space a 
territorial function for the purposes of regime construction.  In that sense Haas made a 
valuable early contribution to thinking about the vastness of the oceans and of the living 
things that constitute ocean space by attributing to it the same ontological status as 
territory.  It is, of course a double-edged sword contribution as once the oceans are 
perceived on the same plane of reality as land a twofold effect occurs.  Firstly, there is the 
recognition that the ocean space is not limitless; it has boundaries.
2
 And secondly, once 
boundaries are concretised, there is ample room for territorial disputes over the space 
itself and increasingly the resources contained within those boundaries. 
 
Ocean space and the ecosystem which is used in the legal definition of the 
methodological approach to the management of ocean space in fisheries are described as 
  
1
 Ernst B. Haas, (1975) ‘Is there a Hole in the Whole? Knowledge, Technology, Interdependence and the 
Construction of International Regimes’, International Organization, 29:3, p.831. 
2
 See Andrew Abbott (1988), ‘Things of Boundaries’, Social Research, Vol. 62, No.4, p.860. 
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complex adaptive systems and the behaviour of the parts or individual scale-entities has a 
co-evolutionary effect on the behaviour of all the other agents.  In other words non-
linearity represents a clear break with Cartesian certainty and opens up theoretical space 
for uncertainty, irreducible indeterminism and exposes the weaknesses of our fondness 
for reductionist forms of analysis.  Breaking things down into their smallest constituent 
parts seems to have much appeal but when we reveal the objects of our enquiries are 
more often than not repeated practices and processes situated in irreversible time we are 
confronted with the in-built limitation of both static analysis and reductive analysis.
3
 
 
This is not an entirely new idea and has been well explained in other texts.  Karl 
Mannheim in his classic work Ideology and Utopia exposes our tendencies to attempt to 
make rigid and fixed practices and processes to give the illusory appearance of spatio-
temporal stability.  Again, this situation may make for a certain utility of analysis, but 
covers up critical areas of experience such as complexity, emergence and the inherent 
instability of identities.   
 
He notes: 
 
‘The world of external objects and of psychic experience appears to be in a state of continuous 
flux.  Verbs are more adequate symbols for this situation than nouns.  The fact that we give names 
to things which are in flux implies inevitably certain stabilization oriented along the lines of 
collective activity.  The derivation of our meanings emphasizes and stabilizes that aspect of things 
which is relevant to activity and covers up, in the interest of collective action, the perpetually fluid 
process underlying all things’.
4
 
 
Mannheim published this work in the 1930s, not so long after the establishment of 
quantum mechanics, which had revealed a number of fundamental problems for physics 
but which also became germane to the study of social systems too.  However Mannheim 
appears to be acutely aware of the functional reasons why we do not, in most cases, 
attempt to designate things as they really are.  He acknowledges that the “interest of 
collective action” serves to simplify and solidify unstable entities for the explicit purpose 
  
3
 For a detailed explanation of the irreversibility of time see Ilya Prigogine (1997), The End of Certainty: 
Time Chaos and the New Laws of Nature, New York and London, The Free Press. 
4
 Karl Mannheim (1936), Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, London 
and New York, Keegan Paul, p.20. 
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of functional activity.  This logic gives impetus for us to problematise the fluid concepts 
of nation-states, the system of nation-states and the myriad conventions that constitute 
most aspects of global governance, including international environmental law. 
 
The nation-state and the international system of states are on-going projects and can 
never be said to be fully complete.  There is a continuous ebbing and flowing of people, 
information, laws and norms, and the transportation of matter-energy flows.  When 
Mannheim mentions the “the perpetually fluid process underlying all things” we should 
be careful to place this phrase in context.  It can be taken too far thus disabling our 
attempts to analyse any given phenomenon.  The stabilization of things is often required 
for us to make any meaningful statements about them.  Although Mannheim’s statement 
may be correct, stability is often required for analytical convenience even when we know 
that it merely represents an approximation of the real. 
 
In this essay I will consider one body that has been established to manage the ocean space 
within set geographic boundaries. As stated in article 2 of its convention the objective of 
this body is to act ‘through the application of the precautionary approach and an 
ecosystem approach to fisheries management, to ensure the long-term conservation and 
sustainable use of fishery resources and, in so doing, to safeguard the marine ecosystems 
in which these resources occur.’ 
 
This body is the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization (SPRFMO), 
which was instituted after years of negotiation under the Convention on the Conservation 
and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific Ocean in 
November 2009 and entered into force in December 2012.
5
  The Convention itself falls 
under the auspices of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
6
 
which was established the 1982, although many similar regional regimes predate the 
present framework for ocean governance. 
 
In the pages that follow I will outline a critique that takes the terms mentioned at the very 
beginning of this essay into account and suggest that far from being reasonable and 
unproblematic, it is more reasonable to suggest that these words and terms, and others 
similar to them, and the framework of thinking in which they inhabit, are indicative of the 
  
5
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Treaties-and-International-Law/01-Treaties-for-which-NZ-is-Depositary/0-
sprfmo-convention.php 
6
 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 396, entered 
into force, Nov. 16, 1994. 
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culturally modernist ontology and predominantly positivist epistemology that tend to 
dominate the discourse of so-called advanced industrialised societies.  In doing so I will 
have to open up the scope of my enquiry well beyond environmental law and into areas 
of philosophy and in particular the question of the relationship humans have with nature, 
the international political economy of industries beyond fishing techniques and accepted 
practice, and the great uncertainties and gaps in scientific knowledge
7
 in general and of 
the deep seas in particular. 
 
Furthermore, my point of departure necessitates a questioning of the use and abuse of 
technology to pursue questionable ends in general
8
 and technological practices in 
particular, especially those practices that have enabled humans to fish in deeper waters 
using techniques that do not discriminate between fish, marine mammals, other life-forms 
and the ocean space.  
 
It should be clear by now that this introduction has identified at least two areas of similar 
but quite distinct areas of critical theory.  The first of these is that of the original 
Frankfurt School of Critical Theory espoused by Horkheimer and Adorno and their now 
famous maxim which states ‘[T]o the Enlightenment, that which does not reduce to 
numbers, and ultimately to the one, becomes illusion; modern positivism writes it off as 
literature’.
9
  The second is to be found in the work of Michel Foucault and in particular 
his notion of ‘governmentality’, which he first used in a lecture series at the College de 
France, summed up succinctly by Colin Gordon as the ‘conduct of conduct’.
10
 
 
My aim in choosing this approach to address a question of International environmental 
law is not to take aim at ‘law, institutions and contract’ in general in the style of 
Nietzsche or Deleuze.  Rather it is firstly, to suggest that there may be an opening for 
theoretical and empirical space that might enable us to ask, what would be gained if we 
conceived of traditional analytic units not as fixed, unitary entities, but as contingent, 
  
7
 Ludwik Fleck “To Look, To See, to Know [1947] (1986), in R. S. Cohen and T. Schnelle (eds.), 
Cognition and Fact – Materials on Ludwik Fleck, Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing, pp.129-151. Ludwik 
Fleck [1935] (1986), in R. S. Cohen and T. Schnelle (eds.), Cognition and Fact – Materials on Ludwik 
Fleck, Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing, pp. 59-78. 
8
 See Martin Heidegger (1977), The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, New York, 
Harper and Row. 
9
 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno [1944] (1997), Dialectic of Enlightenment, New York, Continuum. 
10
 Colin Gordon (1991), ‘Governmental rationality: an introduction’, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon 
and Peter Miller (eds.) The Foucault Effect: studies in governmental rationality, London, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, p.2. 
 7 
 
contested, aporiatic and socially complex flows?  This does not necessarily mean that 
international politics and international law should rescind conventional theoretical 
assumptions about states, economies and non-state actors, for instance, the notion that 
actors can be reduced to a certain singularity, fixity and unity; I have affirmed the utility 
of that approach at the outset, but rather that it might enable us to touch on the question of 
whether other, critical theory might provide us with a more sophisticated model for 
understanding the complexity of world affairs, which might illuminate the socially 
complex and perpetually contested and emergent flows that much of the ‘problem-
solving’ focus has occluded.   
 
Secondly, it is to suggest that although the state-form appears to hold a particular 
centrality in international fora a different comprehension of power that takes us beyond 
the concept of the sovereign state within global governance and offers up an arguably 
more realistic view of power; how it is exercised, and how it relates between agents to 
produces particular outcomes is arguably preferable.  In this sense power is not held; it is 
productive and relational.  As I have previously noted, ‘Governance is not simply the 
state or the functions and actions of government that enable authority to be recognised 
and exercised. Governance is the multitude of controlling mechanisms that enable power 
relations to function in a manner that is said to be efficient’.
11
  In other words, in the 
Foucauldian sense, it is the introduction of economy into the functioning of governance 
and ultimately of states themselves. 
 
To conclude this introduction I should make clear that although this essay addresses an 
issue of international environmental law, it is apparent that interdisciplinary approaches 
are necessary in order to even ask the appropriate questions.  Thus it seems necessary to 
attempt some understanding of the hard sciences, of the philosophy of science, and of 
political economy.  One should not take the world as given; one should ask how the 
objects that make up our world have come into being and given our meagre knowledge 
and understanding of things (which are not ‘things’ at all) such as ecosystems, then by 
asking these questions we may move away from the Enlightenment myth of stability of 
identities and certainty of knowledge and ultimately ask: is it possible to deal with the 
myriad connections between all of the flows of organic and inorganic energy, matter and 
meaning in all of their states of (in)coherence?  To attempt such an undertaking 
necessitates a tripartite arrangement of arguments; firstly of being, secondly of knowing 
and finally of discourse.  This approach might get us to the beginning of the right 
  
11
 Robert Deuchars (2004), The International Political Economy of Risk: Rationalism, Calculation and 
Power, Burlington and Aldershot, Ashgate, p.57. 
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question set which ultimately, might not be answered but as Bergson and Deleuze both 
assert, have to be in due course, properly stated, which is the real task at hand.
12
  By the 
same token the negation of a problem-solving approach in favour of a genealogical one, 
offers up some hope for change.  It is clear that although global environmental 
consciousness has a foothold in the consideration of problems such as climate change, 
nuclear proliferation, the destruction of the oceans, some of these issues threaten species 
survival; and by that I mean the human species, it is equally clear that the grand 
narratives offered up by conventions such as the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, the valuable work of the IPCC and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to name the most prominent, have not achieved much.  It would 
be very overly-simplistic to ascribe blame for the lack of progress at the abstract notion of 
the state and the national interest.  Therefore it may by more fruitful to inquire, as I have 
suggested above, into the dominant episteme, acceptable discourse, and cultural 
individualism.  International environmental law in this regard is of particular interest as it 
can be viewed as a beneficial enterprise but by the same token it can also be viewed as 
serving to maintain the status quo, at a point in human history, when to many the politico-
strategic notion of the state, the politico-economic doctrine of liberalism and the politico-
social ideology of individualism need to be called into question. 
 
This essay is necessarily limited so of the myriad and interconnected issues that are 
possible choices for inclusion; its focus is on a particular regional fisheries management 
organisation.  The reason for this is twofold.  The South Pacific Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisation (SPFRMO) has been argued to be a departure and an 
improvement on other RFMOs due to the fact that the ‘decision-making procedure “raises 
the bar” for those members that would seek to avoid compliance with its decisions’.
13
  
The second reason is that despite its arguable ‘success’ in this area of law, a wider 
problem presents itself insofar as the institutional arrangements have and continue to 
collide with the imperatives mentioned at the outset, namely the fixation with a particular 
ontology, epistemology and discourse, despite the near collapse of one of the major 
species said to be under the management of the convention and as such the institution: the 
Trachurus Murphyi or Chilean Jack Mackerel.
14
  
 
  
12
 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism (1990), New York: Zone Books, pp.15-16. 
13 Howard S. Schiffman (2013), ‘Culture, Conservation and Competition: Orange Roughy and the South 
Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization’ Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy, 
15:3-4, p.198. 
14
 New York Times ‘In Mackerel’s Plunder, Hints of Epic Fish Collapse’, January 25, 2012. 
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2. Critical Theory: a short overview 
 
In an essay published in 1937 Max Horkheimer outlined the basic theoretical contours 
of what would form the foundations of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory.  In 
this essay he distinguished between traditional theory i.e. theory as understood by 
conventional science.  He notes:   
 
Theory is stored up knowledge, put in a form that makes it useful for the closest 
possible description of facts. Poincare compares science to a library that must cease-
lessly expand. Experimental physics is the librarian who takes care of acquisitions, that 
is, enriches knowledge by supplying new material. Mathematical physics—the theory of 
natural science in the strictest sense—keeps the catalogue; without the catalogue one 
would have no access to the library's rich contents.
15
 
 
This sentiment was maintained by Horkheimer and Adorno in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment
16
 with their critique of the Enlightenment. For Horkheimer and Adorno 
the promise of the Enlightenment was always a false one; Cartesian certainty and a 
singular truth of the world and of the self.  Therefore, although influenced by Kant, they 
turned against him and his appeal to reason and posited that from the beginning 
Enlightenment was a self-fulfilling myth.  Their targets were not only the world as they 
found it around them but at the epistemological level a view of the world founded by 
Descartes
17
 and the effects of his legacy in their own times which could be found the 
logical positivism of Carnap, Mach and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, whereby 
Wittgenstein’s opening salvo reads as follows: 
 
1 The world is everything that is the case. 
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things. 
  
15
 Max Horkheimer [1937] (2002), ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’, in Critical Theory Selected Essays 
Max Horkheimer, New York, Continuum, p.188 
16
 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno [1944] (1997), op.cit.  It was not until Jürgen Habermas took over 
the Frankfurt School that it returned to a type of enquiry that could be accurately described as Kantian, in 
the cosmo-political sense. By contrast, Horkheimer, Benjamin and especially Adorno held on to a deep 
mis-trust of modernity, a certain type of pessimism, but with the hope that the emancipatory potential of 
Critical Theory could release the individual from the myth of the Enlightenment. 
17
 For good or ill, Descartes greatest achievement was not his famous cogito but his mathematisation of 
nature by quantifying the natural world.  In other words by enumerating colours, sounds, odours, tastes and 
textures he has enabled us to mathematize and more importantly objectify the natural world, thus 
solidifying the artificial separation between man and nature.  Man becomes subject and nature his object. 
See Antonio R. Damasio (1994), Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, London and 
Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
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1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts. 
1.12 For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the 
case. 
1.13 The facts in logical space are the world. 
1.2 The world divides into facts.
18
 
 
To counter this view (although I have to note that Wittgenstein had a radical change of 
mind later and moved to language games in the Blue and Brown Books, which formed the 
basis for his Philosophical Investigations),
19
  Horkheimer posited the difference between 
traditional theory and critical theory in the following way: 
 
The social sciences take human and nonhuman nature in its entirety as given and are 
concerned only with how relationships are established between man and nature and 
between man and man. However, an awareness of this relativity, immanent in bourgeois 
science, in the relationship between theoretical thought and facts, is not enough to bring 
the concept of theory to a new stage of development. What is needed is a radical 
reconsideration, not of the scientist alone, but of the knowing individual as such.
20
 
 
What Horkheimer meant by this is not a simple negation of Cartesian thinking but a 
different epistemology, partly informed by orthodox Marxism but also of the 
phenomenology of Husserl
21
 and Heidegger.
22
  In other words rather than the 
disembodied self, exemplified by Descartes, knowledge as an end in itself, and the 
primacy of knowing over being, Horkheimer situates the production and use of 
knowledge in a stricter situational position.  Taking some of its inspiration from Kant and 
Weber ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’ grounded critique on more sociological grounds 
and represented a shift towards a sharper analysis of the base-superstructure model of 
classical Marxism, with the emphasis firmly on an attempt to understand the 
superstructure.  Or in more simple terms Horkheimer and his colleagues embarked on a 
project that attempted to understand how despite conditions of relative freedom, the 
benefits of action in the social world always tended towards favouring the interests of 
capital over labour. 
  
18
  Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London, Kegan Paul, p.25. 
19
 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958), The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the ‘Philosophical 
Investigations’ New York, Harper and Row; Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations, G. E. 
Anscome (trans.) [1953] (2001), Oxford Blackwell. 
20
  Max Horkheimer [1937] (2002), op.cit., p.199. 
21
 See Edmund Husserl [1954] (1970) The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology, Evanston, Northwestern University Press. 
22
 See Pierre Bordieu (1988), The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger, Stanford, Stanford University 
Press. 
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This foundational essay formed the basis of the early Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, 
although there had been antecedents most notably to be found in the Prison Notebooks of 
Antonio Gramsci,
23
 the Italian Marxist intellectual.  Basically Horkheimer and Adorno, 
with the other member of the Frankfurt School, most notably Erich Fromm and Walter 
Benjamin represented a shift in Marxist thinking away from the teleogical and 
deterministic thought of Marx and Engels and took Marxism in to a more holistic view of 
society and the superstructure.  The most important aspects for Adorno were the role of 
culture and of the culture industry in general and for Fromm, a movement towards the 
psychoanalytics of desire in the socius.  When thinking about environmental questions it 
therefore comes as some surprise that writers such as Horkheimer with his critique of 
reason
24
, Adorno with his critique of the culture industry
25
 and Fromm with his deep 
insights into the drivers of human behaviour have been largely overlooked or more 
accurately ignored by mainstream inquiries into the relationship between science, nature, 
human behaviour and what they would term bourgeois law, including environmental 
law.
26
 
 
I now turn to a short overview of Foucauldian governmentality and its applicability in the 
context of this essay. Governmentality represents for Foucault a shift away from an 
understanding of government that is centred on the concept of state sovereignty.  
Foucault was interested in government as an art, as in how best to govern.
27
  It also has a 
focus on the discourses used by various agents beyond the formal apparatus of the state 
and the mechanisms by which state legitimacy becomes de-centred and how the focus 
shifts to various agencies that craft people’s conduct, making them reflect on their 
behaviour, and in Foucault’s view becoming part of a self-regulating set of processes.  
 
This shift away from sovereignty as the guiding principle or expression of power in the 
international realm can be seen in the current context.  To be sure, the state and its 
importance is not underestimated; rather it is suggestive that a model of power that only 
  
23
 See Antonio Gramsci (1971), Selections from Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, Quintin Hoare and 
Geoffrey Nowell (trans. and eds.), London, Lawrence and Wishart.  Of particular relevance here is the 
fragments called ‘Americanism and Fordism’. 
24
 Max Horkheimer (2003), Eclipse of Reason, New York, Continuum. 
25
 Theodor Adorno (1991) The Culture Industry: selected Essays on mass culture, London, Routledge 
26
 Erich Fromm (1971), Man for Himself: An Enquiry into the Psychology of Ethics, London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul; Erich Fromm [1942] (2001), London and New York, Continuum.  I have deliberately left 
out any reference to Walter Benjamin as he was the most Nietzschean of the original Frankfurt School. 
27
 Michel Foucault (1991a), ‘Governmentality’ in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.) 
The Foucault Effect: studies in governmental rationality, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
 12 
 
gives the state primacy is limited and that power should be conceived of as extending 
well beyond the agency of the state and into the realm of other agents.  In this sense 
Foucault highlights the limits of the sovereignty model of power and suggests that 
governance extends well beyond the state to include mundane processes and practices, 
the establishment of conventions and to use an example in this context the formalisation 
of institutions with expert bodies tasked with deriving the appropriate facts to be brought 
to bear on particular problems.  These mundane practices of course include coding, 
classification and most importantly calculative practices.  Immediately we can see the 
link between fisheries management in the form of total allowable catch (TAC) and how 
Foucault would describe it as a technology of power, although he would much later shift 
his position to suggest that the panoply of calculative practices were more indicative of a 
control function rather than one of domination. 
 
So it should come as no surprise that the SPRFMO when viewed through the lenses of 
governmentality is formalised at the institutional level, has a secretariat, is tied to the 
disciplines of academia in the form of a scientific committee and exercises its compliance 
measures and objection procedures through expert knowledge, both in the form of normal 
science and modernist managerialism.  In this sense the SPRFMO is tied into a model of 
governance that has been replicated on a global scale.  This however, is not to suggest, 
that it is all malign and planned for the purpose of pure control.  Rather it is more 
suggestive of a normalising discourse that has globalising tendencies as pointed out by 
Fisher when discussing ‘ecological governmentality’, who notes that: 
 
These dominant global discourses can be co-opted by the state in advancing the goals of 
‘ecological governmentality’; that is, these discourses are used through state agency as a 
means of gaining control and regulating the social life of both individuals and nature.
28
 
 
In this sense nature and in this case the oceans are analogous to Foucault’s ‘docile 
bodies’.
29
  They are situated within a particular framework of thinking and are framed as 
passive and in a similar manner to Fisher’s discussion of the application of ecological 
governmentality to indigenous peoples in Brazil the world’s oceans and the life-forms 
that inhabit them are similarly idealized as ‘nature’, and concomitant to this idea is that 
they are passive actors in a game of dominant discourses whereby ‘Idealized 
transnational environmental narratives often then converge and conflict with other 
  
28
 P. Brian Fisher (n.d.) ‘ECOLOGICAL GOVERNMENTALITY: THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE 
LOCAL IN THE RIO NEGRO RIVER REGION OF BRAZIL’ working paper at 
http://astepback.com/EVSS695/Rio%20Negro.pdf, accessed 20/08/13, p.1. 
29
 Michel Foucault (1991b), Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, London, Penguin, pp.135-170. 
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dominant global discourses, such as globalization, neoliberalism, modernization, and 
sustainability, creating contestable grounds for multifarious interpretations of nature, 
often with significant consequences for local peoples’.
30
   
 
We can see that this departure from the sovereignty model of power, if we accept the 
argument, has major implications for the words and terms that I introduced at the very 
beginning of this essay.  A shift from power embodied in the state form as formalised 
political power towards the ‘best’ way to govern as more of an art of government and of 
governance has global implications.  As I have noted in previous research: 
 
Foucault suggests that the formulation of the economic as a separate entity changes the 
idea of what the purpose of governing is. Governing becomes much more of an 
economic affair and, as such, this different plane of reality is re-constituted on the 
ground that makes it amenable to rational calculation, and even more so, to numerical 
calculation’.
31
 
 
It is within this framework of thinking that I will now turn to the establishment of the 
South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation.  To be clear from the outset 
a critique of a particular piece of International Environmental law is not to suggest that 
the whole endeavour is not worth the effort.  On the contrary by developing a different 
way of thinking about any aspect of the attempts to control the harmful effects of human 
action in ocean space may not bring about the sought after change in terms of immediate 
policy prescription but it seems clear that the current framework of thought, the system of 
facts and the measures that are currently in place simply means that other worlds are 
possible and the challenge, given that we know this, is what we are prepared to do about 
it? 
 
3. The South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation 
 
Our knowledge of the vast expanse of the South Pacific Ocean and the impact of fishing 
and particular fishing techniques is weak.  Deep sea or bottom trawling of fish that are 
long-lived, relatively unproductive and poorly understood within their environment is 
without question a destructive practice and the effects on fragile marine ecosystems as 
well as the food chain is poorly understood.  Indeed, the establishment of the SPRFMO is 
testament to this fact.  There have been catastrophic collapses in fish stocks as a direct 
  
30
 P. Brian Fisher op.cit., pp.1-2. 
31
 Robert Deuchars (2004) op.cit., p.64. 
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consequence of industrial-scale fishing since at least the 1970s; however that the 
SPRFMO has only been in formal existence for all intents and purposes for less than one 
year suggests strongly that not only is it a weak organisation, the other regional fisheries 
management organisations are too.
32
 
 
As Jennings notes: 
 
Some RFMOs have been supporting the use of MPAs in management. For example, the 
North-East Atlantic Fishery Commission (NEAFC) has designated MPAs on Hatton 
Bank, Rockall Bank, the Logachev Mounds, and West Rockall Mounds to protect deep-
water corals (NEAFC, 2006), and the newly established South Pacific Regional 
Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) has agreed to voluntary measures, 
starting 30 September 2007, not to expand bottom-fishing activities into new regions.
33
 
 
Despite these measures Jennings goes on to suggest that overall the regime and the 
numerous regional bodies are largely ineffective in many regards, in particular to Marine 
Protected Areas (MPA’s).  As he argues: 
 
Although scientific analysis and advice can indicate when MPAs may help to meet 
management objectives for state, the contribution of MPAs to meeting these objectives 
depends on whether or not realized fishing pressure is consistent with that assumed 
in the predictions. In many MPAs, unauthorized fishing has compromised the 
achievement of objectives, and enforcement and compliance have been inadequate or 
unsupported. The Galapagos Marine Resources Reserve is a good example.  Currently, 
it is the world’s fifth largest area designated as an MPA and a World Heritage Site, but 
there has been almost no capacity to control illegal fishing.
34
 
 
That being said, there are some interesting features of the SPFRMO that suggest that 
there has been some evolution in the thinking of the management of the South Pacific 
Ocean.  The first point to note is reasonably uncontroversial in that the organization is 
guided by both the principle of precaution and an ecosystem approach (Article 3 1b, 2a i, 
ii, iii, 2b).
35
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The article and related provisions mentioned above state as follows: 
 
(b) apply the precautionary approach and an ecosystem approach in accordance with 
paragraph 2. 
 
2 (a) The precautionary approach as described in the 1995 Agreement and the Code of 
Conduct shall be applied widely to the conservation and management of fishery 
resources in order to protect those resources and to preserve the marine ecosystems in 
which they occur, and in particular the Contracting Parties, the Commission and 
subsidiary bodies shall: 
 
(i) be more cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable, or inadequate; 
 
(ii) not use the absence of adequate scientific information as a reason for postponing or 
failing to take conservation and management measures; and  
 
(iii) take account of best international practices regarding the application of the 
precautionary approach, including Annex II of the 1995 Agreement and the Code of 
Conduct. 
 
(b) An ecosystem approach shall be applied widely to the conservation and management 
of fishery resources through an integrated approach under which decisions in relation to 
the management of fishery resources are considered in the context of the functioning of 
the wider marine ecosystems in which they occur to ensure the long-term conservation 
and sustainable use of those resources and in so doing, safeguard those marine 
ecosystems. 
 
The centrality of the ecosystem approach is important here as it represents a shift in 
fisheries management away from the allowable catch of fisheries and towards a more 
holistic sense of attempting to know the connectionism inherent in such systems.  Wang 
notes that the term “ecosystem” was coined by Alfred George Tamsley in 1935
36
 
(although the idea has been around for much longer and he outlines five key features of 
an ecosystem as follows: 
 
(1) An ecosystem exists in a space with boundaries that may or may not be explicitly 
delineated.  Ecosystems are distinguishable from each other based on their biophysical 
attributes and their locations. (2) An ecosystem includes both living organisms and their 
abiotic environment, including pools of organic and inorganic materials. (3) The 
organisms interact with each other, and interact with the physical environment through 
fluxes of energy, organic and inorganic materials amongst the pools. These fluxes are 
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mediated and functionally controlled by species’ behavior and environmental forces. (4) 
An ecosystem is dynamic. Its structure and function change with time. (5) An 
ecosystem exhibits emergent properties that are characteristic of its type and that are 
invariant within the domain of existence.
37
 
 
What this outline of an ecosystem and an ecosystem approach to ‘problem-solving’ goes 
against the grain of much commentary regarding the human relationship with science, 
nature and time and this problem can be illustrated within the Convention itself.  At 2b 
the Convention invokes the word ‘sustainable’ as being central to aligning its principled 
objectives and the ecosystem approach.  It is not entirely clear however, what an 
‘ecosystem approach’ actually is.  This point is exemplified by recent book-length 
contributions such as Christensen and Maclean’s edited volume.
38
  In short an ecosystem 
approach seems on the surface to be an idea linked quite loosely to the notion of holism 
and as reported by the journal Science it is ‘…Greater holism in fisheries management 
[that] can be achieved by consideration of multiplespecies interactions, broad-scale 
physical forcing, and the response of management to pressure for greater harvests under 
uncertainty’.
39
  Indeed there also appears to be a tension between the ecosystem approach 
and sustainability, which I will turn to next.  The argument is summed up by Pitcher and 
Pauly who argue that:  
 
Even if our science and management were capable of sustaining exploitation at a 
defined ecosystem structure, we argue that this is the wrong goal…management that 
moves aquatic systems in their primal states and abundance should be rewarded, and 
that this rebuilding and restoration of ecosystems should be the overarching goal of the 
new fisheries management.
40
 
 
  
37
 Space precludes me from a detailed discussion of this very important concept.  However for a fuller 
discussion around these themes see Mark Newman, Albert-Lasló Barabási, Duncan Watts The Structure 
and Dynamics of Networks (2006), Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, Ilya Prigogine 
(1980), From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in the Physical Sciences, W. H. Freeman and 
Company, San Francisco, Ilya Prigogine (2003), Is Future Given?, New Jersey, London, Singapore, Hong 
Kong. World Scientific, Robert Deuchars (2010), “Deleuze, DeLanda and Social Complexity: Implications 
for the ‘International’” Journal of International Political Theory, Vol. 6, pp. 161-187. 
38
 Villy Christensen and Jay Maclean (eds.) (2011), Ecosystem Approaches to Fisheries: A Global 
Perspective, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
39 Louis W. Botsford, Juan Carlos Castilla, and Charles H. Peterson, (1997), ‘The Management of Fisheries 
and Marine Ecosystems’ Science, Vol. 277, 23 July. 
40
 Tony J. Pitcher and Daniel Pauly (1998), ‘Rebuilding ecosystems, not sustainability as the proper goal of 
fishery management’, in Tony J. Pitcher, Paul J. B. Hart and Daniel Pauly (eds.) Reinventing Fisheries 
Management, London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 311-312. 
 17 
 
Likewise, ‘Sustainable development’ is not, however, an uncontested term.  It is arguably 
a euphemism that hides and distorts the trade-off between the economic growth 
imperative and negative externalities.
41
 It used to be argued that this was a liberal or neo-
liberal imperative.  However, this is not quite accurate.  It is more accurate to state that 
the economic growth imperative is a function of late modernist cultures as the system of 
states, of production, finance and trade and of cultures become increasingly subject to 
globalising tendencies.
42
  It is also a quite understandable euphemism in the face of 
arguments about the limits to growth.  Contained within the discourse of sustainable 
development is the discourse of corporate responsibility and there are elements of truth 
within this discourse.  However, from a critical theoretical perspective this discourse 
although it may produce some real-world lessening of harm is reactionary and still 
follows the internal logic of capitalist and individualist self-interest.  If it were truly 
reactionary though then it would be highly unlikely that any environmental conventions 
would be signed far less come into force.  Space precludes me from going into too much 
detail here but this is also the basic argument presented by Karl Polayni in his classic 
work The Great Transformation.
43
 
 
Furthermore, the (mostly accepted) narrative of the human relationship with nature is one 
that comes from a long-line of thinking that can be traced in part to the sacral context of 
early Christian thought that over time became entangled with Occidental modernity, 
liberalist notions of growth and the perfectibility of man.
44
  However, as Ilya Prigogine 
correctly points out: 
 
‘…it should be noted that there are no limits to structural stability.  Every system may 
present instabilities when suitable perturbations are introduced.  Therefore there can be 
no end to history….This “over creativity” of nature emerges naturally…in which 
“mutations” and “innovations” occur stochastically and are integrated into the system 
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by the deterministic relations prevailing at the moment.  Thus, we have in this 
perspective the constant generation for “new types” and “new ideas” that may be 
incorporated into the structure of the system, causing its continual evolution’
45
 
 
So we can see immediately that the legal convention becomes entangled with politico-
economic and politico-cultural elements.  Thus it should come as no surprise that 
attempts to codify and protect the oceans through the juridical form is played out on the 
surface of state and non-state actor interests with the complicating factors of instabilities 
of identities and existing within a system that is always ‘far from equilibrium’.
46
  In New 
Zealand this matter is made explicitly complex due to Maori fishing rights, and as 
Schiffman points out, due to their part-ownership in Sealord, which is one of the largest 
industry players in the Orange Roughy market; Orange Roughy are one of the most over-
fished using the bottom trawling method.
47
 
 
The second point of note is centred on the question of compliance with the numerous 
non-binding obligations embodied in the Convention and as such within the SPRFMO 
itself.  Nation-states that are signatories to the Convention have a number of measures 
contained within the regime that take us from the general and difficult philosophical 
problem that manifests in all complex adaptive systems
48
 towards the particularities of 
the SPRFMO itself, how it is constituted in law, supported by science in the broadest 
sense of the word, and how even though many of its measures are voluntary there has 
been a degree of compliance that cannot be explained by realist or neo-realist 
international politics and therefore offers up a semblance of hope for similar measures to 
be adopted in other international legal fora. 
 
4.  Voluntary compliance measures and Article 17 
Even though the SPRFMO did not become a legal entity until 2012 a number of interim 
measures were adopted.  The interim measures were voluntary and non-binding. 
Measures apply to pelagic and bottom fisheries. (Jack Mackerel are a good example of a 
pelagic species and Orange Roughy are a good example of deep-sea fish). 
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In respect of pelagic fisheries, states agreed to a number of obligations.  These included 
reporting current levels of fishing to the interim Secretariat and to place limits on the 
overall number of vessels permitted to fish in the any one particular area of the ocean. 
There was also a degree of co-operation on the scientific front, largely related to 
establishing a data set of available stocks.  Participating nation-states also agreed to 
ensure that vessel-monitoring systems were installed on the vessels they sent out to fish.  
 
For bottom fisheries, the interim measures were even more stringent. States agreed to 
limit fishing effort to existing levels. They also agreed to refrain from fishing in new 
regions where bottom trawling was not in use and require impact assessments before 
fishing was permitted.  Parties also agreed on…“conservation and management measures 
for areas vulnerable to bottom trawling; require vessels to cease bottom trawling within 5 
nautical miles of any site with evidence of vulnerable marine ecosystems; appoint 
observers to vessels conducting bottom trawling; and ensure all vessels are equipped with 
vessel monitoring systems”.
49
 
 
Firstly, with regards to existing levels being maintained for both pelagic and deep sea fish 
this represents an on-going problem for Chile for example, but especially for pelagic 
species.
50
  Secondly, as noted above in an ocean as vast as the Pacific, 5 nautical miles is 
statistically insignificant given the state of current scientific knowledge of the seabed and 
the ‘move away’ measure is very difficult to assess on an on-going basis. Finally, deep 
sea trawling is incredibly destructive and its impact and the corresponding ‘impact 
assessment’ requirements are incredibly complex i.e. small perturbations in complex 
adaptive systems display emergent properties and as such also there can be large and 
unintended consequences in the long term of seemingly small occurrences today.  As 
Vinson points out ‘[T]he unique characteristics of the deep sea, including remarkable 
habitats such as seamounts, make deep sea ecology invaluable.  Unfortunately, 
anthropogenic activities threaten the health of the deep sea.  One of the greatest threats is 
deep sea bottom trawling…The ecological impact…is so grave that the minimal 
economic benefit in no way justifies the practice’.
51
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So it is with caution that I proceed to outline the decision-making and dispute resolution 
mechanisms that arguably have some promise for other international environmental 
regimes. 
 
Article 17 of the Convention has the following key provisions: 
 
2 
. (a) Any member of the Commission may present to the Executive Secretary an objection to 
a decision within 60 days of the date of notification “the objection period”. In that event the 
decision shall not become binding on that member of the Commission to the extent of the 
objection, except in accordance with paragraph 3 and Annex II.  
.  
. (b) A member of the Commission that presents an objection shall at the same time:  
. (i) specify in detail the grounds for its objection;  
. (ii) adopt alternative measures that are equivalent in effect to the decision to which it has 
objected and have the same date of application; and  
. (iii) advise the Executive Secretary of the terms of such alternative measures.  
.  
(c) The only admissible grounds for an objection are that a decision unjustifiably 
discriminates in form or in fact against the member of the Commission, or is inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Convention or other relevant international law as reflected in the 
1982 Convention or the 1995 Agreement.
52
 
 
The Russian Federation lodged such an objection under Article 17 stating that its general 
objection was that:  
 
“the 2010 catch cannot be used as the basis for determining of national quotas for the 
following reasons. 
1. The 2010 catch was obtained in the time when the Revised Interim Measures for Pelagic 
Fisheries were in force, and in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of these Measures 
“the management measures in these Interim Measures in no way special or a precedent 
should serve as a reference for future management decisions of the Commission” and 
“are not to be considered the precedents for future allocation or other decisions taken by 
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the Commission in accordance with Article 21 of the Convention, relating to the 
participation in fisheries for Trachurus species”.
53
 
 
The Russian Federation gave a number of supplementary objections but as reported by 
the Commission its principle objection was that: 
 
The Russian Federation states that the division of shares in the catch limit of Trachurus 
murphyi for 2013, as set out in CMM 1.01, “demonstrates an unjustifiable discrimination 
against the Russian Federation in form and in fact, and is inconsistent with the provisions of 
the Convention”. The Russian Federation states that the Commission has “neither grounds 
nor competence to review the catch data presented by the Parties”.
54
 
 
In accordance with the decision-making process of the Commission the Russian 
Federation was obliged to put in place an alternative limit catch. Also in accordance with 
the Commissions’ rules the Russian objection was placed before the Commission’s 
Review panel under article 17 5 (a)-(f). 
 
The wording of article 17 6 is instructive in this regard given what subsequently 
transpired.  It states: 
 
6 Nothing in this Article limits the right of a member of the Commission at any time to 
refer a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention for binding 
settlement in accordance with the provisions of this Convention relating to the settlement of 
disputes. 
 
In short, the Russian Federation voluntarily complied with the findings of the Review 
panel which stated as follows: 
 
100. In light of the foregoing, pursuant to Article 17(5) (e) of the Convention, the Review Panel: 
a. Finds that the Decision to which objection has been presented unjustifiably discriminates in form or in 
fact against Russia; 
b. Finds that the alternative measures adopted by Russia are not equivalent in effect to the Decision to 
which objection has been presented by Russia; 
c. Recommends the following alternative measures as equivalent in effect to the Decision to which 
objection has been presented: 
Russia will authorise vessels registered in the Russian Federation to catch Trachurus murphyi in the 
Convention Area in 2013: 
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. (i) only after Russia concludes from data reported by the Organisation, and in accordance with Article 3, 
paragraph 1(a)(v) of the Convention, that it is likely that the total catch in 2013 will not reach the 
total allowable catch of 360,000 tonnes referred to in paragraph 6 of CMM 1.01, and  
. (ii) only until the Organisation reports that this total allowable catch has been reached;  
d. Finds, without prejudice to the foregoing, that the Decision to which objection has been presented by 
Russia is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Convention or other relevant international law as 
reflected in the 1982 Convention or the 1995 Agreement.
55 
Article 17 is generally viewed as the improvement that proponents of the SPFRMO have 
been pushing for and from a strict reading of international environmental law perspective 
it is actually quite significant.  The case demonstrates that it is possible for environmental 
concerns, as in this case, of over-fishing to over-ride the politico-economic interests of a 
very large nation-state.  As we know there is no over-arching authority in the governance 
of international affairs and that the oceans are not only vast and vulnerable but over-
fishing, as well as illegal fishing are notoriously difficult to establish, but more 
importantly, to enforce rules and regimes for their continued sustainability.
56
 
 
If this was the end of the story then we might suggest that care for the environment has 
indeed become superordinate to the interests of capital.  However, on closer inspection 
just because a ruling is binding says nothing about enforcement.  Moreover when viewed 
through the lens of Critical Theory a number of features ought to be highlighted.   Since 
2006 when the initiative to establish the SPRFMO by Australia, New Zealand and Chile, 
there has been a scramble bordering on the edge of madness to decimate the remaining 
stock of Jack Mackerel, involving many countries, vessels and agents.  The most 
notorious of these is probably the Russian–flagged vessel the Lafayette, which isn’t 
actually a fishing vessel but a processing one, which is capable of processing 5470,000 
metric tons per year assuming it operated every day. 
 
At a deeper level though the scramble for remaining resources makes perfect sense.  
RMOs are calculative regimes, supported by a scientific apparatus, so whilst there was an 
ideal posited in 2006 to do something about Orange Roughy and Jack Mackerel it is 
rational that two things should occur.  Firstly, politico-economic interests should extract 
as much of the fish as possible prior to Article 17 becoming binding (this process took 
seven years) and secondly, the knowledge that there might be the political will to enact 
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through juridical forms banning the practice of bottom trawling, then bottom trawling 
activities should be accelerated.  From both the Foucauldian global governmentality 
prism and the more orthodox neo-Marxism of the Frankfurt School of political theory, 
these would be the predicted actions of all the actors that stood to gain from industrialised 
fishing extraction and processing.  It is not even controversial when viewed through these 
lenses. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this essay was to look at an aspect of ocean management in general and in 
particular the institution that was brought into being by the Convention on the 
Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific 
Ocean, the SPFRMO, which is one of the world’s Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations responsible for the South Pacific Ocean.  I have argued that to attempt to 
get a clear understanding of the purpose and function of such regimes it would be 
necessary to look at three inter-related areas; the first of being, the second of knowing 
and the third of discourse.  To that end I introduced a theoretical framework drawn 
primarily from the neo-marxism of the Frankfurt School and what some might label the 
poststructuralist thought of Michel Foucault in general and his notion of governmentality 
in particular.  I also suggested that some engagement with the physical sciences was 
necessary to understand the nexus between international environmental law and ocean 
space which I depicted as a complex adaptive system. 
 
I situated this legal regime within a slightly broader context of science, the philosophy of 
science, technology, political economy and nation-state interests.  One of the interesting 
aspects of marine ‘management’ is its inherent complexity, the fact that the ocean space 
as a system is a complex adaptive one and that our knowledge of it is meagre.  Despite 
this clearly demonstrable ignorance, we have developed techniques that have the 
potential to cause irreparable damage to the fragile marine ecosystem and produce 
unintended consequences long into the future due to the fact that all complex systems 
display emergent properties.   
 
I looked specifically at article 17 of the Convention and argued that although it can be 
viewed as an improvement, I do not view this improvement to be of material significance, 
given the real world consequences on fishing stocks and the discourse that surrounds 
them.  In that sense I have come to the conclusion that the South Pacific Ocean cannot be 
managed under the dominant ways of being and knowing as the notion that it can via a 
 24 
 
regime premised on a legal convention, supported by an administrative and scientific 
apparatus is erroneous.  From a long line of critical theory I have suggested that the 
convention, the idea of management with attendant notions of modernist managerialism 
and a culturally liberalist discourse will produce the effects and outcomes that we have 
before us, namely the devastation of marine life in the Southern Pacific Ocean and the 
continued over-exploitation of the remaining fishing stock, despite binding compliance 
measures.  The SPFRMO is at present locked into a calculative discursive regime and a 
predominantly positivist problem-solving approach to ocean space.  Lest this be too 
gloomy a conclusion I have also suggested that softer aspects of the law such as voluntary 
compliance with international environmental legal rules and regimes is not only possible, 
but with some imagination and political will, capable of expanding.
57
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